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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Although Taiwan's flourishing economy, with continuous
high rates of economic growth in recent years, has been
acclaimed throughout the world as a modern miracle— one of
Asia's Four Dragons^--most western people may not know why
Taiwan enthusiastically plays an active role within the
fabric of complicated and competitive international trade
despite the country's scarce natural resources and high
population density.

First, this paper introduces The Taiwan

Model in economic development.

It explores and analyzes the

impact of the Chinese background on the modern Taiwan
businessman's behavior.

The environmental internal and

external influences on Taiwan's foreign trade, which include
land reform, population change, and the relationship of
substantial diplomacy with foreign countries, are discussed
as well.

The paper also briefly describes the key points of

Taiwan's economic achievements on international trade.
Taiwan presently is worried about a number of barriers
which undermine the country's trading capabilities.

These

trading bottlenecks— the trade-surplus with the United
States, dependence on imports from Japan, commercial
counterfeiting problems, and pressure as a result of massive
1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

foreign exchange reserves— are examined in detail.

Finally,

Taiwan's future international trade prospects are considered
in relation to strong competition from South Korea and
effects of the open door policy of mainland China.
Whether or not other developing countries can duplicate
Taiwan's experience is debatable.

Admittedly, the impact of

the Republic of China on Taiwan the past 30 plus years
has been considerable.

This paper provides clues for

those concerned about the prospects of Taiwan's future
foreign trade.
Taiwan, a small island with an area of 13,885 square
miles, is slightly smaller than Switzerland, the
Netherlands, or the combined area of Massachusetts and
Connecticut.

With a population of 19 million, limited

arable land, and few natural resources, the disparity of
incomes between the top wage earners and those at the bottom
was reduced in 1985 to 4.36 to 1 from 15 to 1 in the 1950s.
Thus the majority of the people are middle

class.2

Taiwan's economic development could be traced first,
from 1895 to 1945, the period of Japanese colonization, and
second, from 1951 to 1965, the period of United States
economic aid.

During the former, the Japanese did not

intend to develop Taiwan's industry to a high degree.

Their

concentration was on developing agricultural raw materials
which could be exported to Japan to support Japanese
industrialization.3

Nonetheless, the 50 years of Japanese
2
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rule on Taiwan were typified by colonized economic
development along with rigid political control.
During the second period. United States aid assisted
Taiwan socially, militarily, and economically.

The aid

primarily helped recover Taiwan's postwar economy and it
controlled inflation in the early 1950s.

The aid also

inaugurated a favorable climate for private investments
or enterprises which were free to concentrate on
labor-intensive processing industries.

This gave Taiwan a

great advantage in international trade.^

Japan and the

United States still are Taiwan's major trading partners in
the global economy.
In 1949 the Nationalists withdrew from mainland China.
Their failure to carry out land reform envisioned by
Dr. Sun Yat-sen, father of the Republic of China,
led to a great urgency to formulate and implement a
series of agricultural development programs which
consolidated the future foundation of industrialization and
provided the incentives necessary for the island's economic
growth.

Subsequently, under prudent economic development

strategies during the 1960s and early 1970s, several Export
Processing Zones (where imported raw materials and
intermediate goods were processed into finished goods for
export) were established to attract foreign capital and
accelerate the rate of export expansion.^
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Chapter 2
THE TAIWAN MODEL IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Impact of Traditional Chinese Characteristics
on Modernized Businessmen's Behaviors
The Chinese traditional philosophy of life emphasizes a
close family system, a great respect for education, and the
brotherhood of man.

As an ethical system, Confucianism has

served the Chinese well for 2500 years and has become a
paramount force in Chinese traditional culture.

Today

most Chinese in Taiwan, regardless of their specific
religious affiliations, or lack of them, are affected
behaviorally and attitudinally by Confucianism.^
Due to rapid industrialization and westernization,
Taiwan's society has changed which, in turn, has influenced
the people's standards of value judgments.

Businessmen

particularly face challenges imposed by changing social and
material environments.

In terms of moral and social

responsibilities, the thinking of the people has remained
virtually unchanged as they have attempted to adapt to an
evolving society combining old traditions with new ideas.
Since the Chinese in Taiwan are deeply affected by
traditional culture, Confucian teachings stressing loyalty,
forgiveness, and moderation— the guiding principles of
4
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life— are deeply rooted in the minds of the people.

The

family unit continues to be the nucleus of society.

Filial

piety is considered a cardinal virtue.

The Chinese approach

to human relationships is learned in the family:

children

are taught to respect their parents at home, teachers in
school, and elder people in society.

These attitudes

radiate from the family to the whole of society.^
The traditional Chinese concept, based on Confucianism,
emphasizes the obligation of children to parents, and young
people to elder people.

Accordingly, the young in an

organization or company must comply with traditional rules
that require expressing a deferential demeanor to their
superiors and heeding their opinions in decision making.
Under these circumstances, what Taiwan's businessmen display
in the face of strong competition in international trade is
a kind of teamwork more than individual performance.
Friendliness and personal warmth are important also.
There is an old Confucian saying:
to come from afar."

"It is a joy for a friend

This has been rephrased by businessmen

in Taiwan: "A buyer from far away received to dinner at a
restaurant is a worthwhile affair." For businessmen in
Taiwan, eating is more than a biological necessity; they
prefer to settle bargains around a dinner table than around
an office conference table.

This involves much mutual

inviting and yielding, and the seating must be just right.
Via formal and informal dinners, Chinese businessmen
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strive to increase their understanding of one another and
make good trades.
Adoring nature is another traditional characteristic
of most Chinese.

They extol the harmony of humanity and

nature, attempt to apply it to their personalities, and
imitate it in their calligraphy.

This adaptation to the

physical environment has greatly influenced Chinese culture
and behavior.®
For instance, written language in China began with
simple pictographs which represented objects.

Many

present-day Chinese characters have evolved from these
pictographs.
ancient |) .

Moon, written as

Other examples are the sun, formerly (T) ,

now E? ; mountain, formerly
now

.

, developed from the

, now lIj ; water, formerly

Many basic pictographs have been extended or

combined to form ideographs.

Sun,^

, and moon,

together,0j^ , mean bright, illustrious, and clear.
, d o u b l e d , , forms the character for forest.
tripled,

,

, the character means a dense forest.®

,
A tree,
If
The

process of character evolution from pictograph to
ideograph illustrates that the Chinese are good at
imitating and that they abound in imagination.
In addition, duplicating Chinese characters challenges
the artistic imagination.

The making of a good calligrapher

is a slow and arduous process.

It requires many years of

copying old masters before one can create a style of one's
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own and be labeled a true calligrapher.

Alas, the ancients

would be dismayed that this imitation process has resulted
in distorted thinking among modernized businessmen in
Taiwan.

Many copy hot-selling consumer products for profit

even when their actions are illegal or they are violating
business ethics.
The Chinese background, steeped in traditions, has
generated positive and negative effects on modern
businessmen in Taiwan.

The Chinese in general, not only

businessmen, continuously maintain their traditional culture
while assimilating outside cultures.

How to combine the

best of the traditional and the new cultures, and promote
the businessmen's social responsibilities and ethics, is the
basis of this study.
Environmental Influences
Success in international trade has earned Taiwan
an honored title :

Newly Industrialized Country of Asia.

Why has Taiwan been so successful in comparison to others?
It has been suggested that Taiwan's unfavorable economic
geographic factors and lack of natural resources have more
than been compensated by an abundance of human resources.
It also has been suggested that the country's close
proximity to mainland China, shadowed by Communist
dictatorship, has forced Taiwan to increase its strength
via the pursuit of foreign trade as a means of survival.
7
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Internal Factors
The island of Taiwan is 244 miles long from tip to tip
and 89 miles wide at the broadest point.

Its northern

extremity is 655 miles southwest of Japan and its southern
tip is 225 miles north of the Philippines.

Although the

soil is fertile and the climate is favorable, only one
fourth of the island is suitable for cultivation.

The

remaining terrain is mountainous, covered by forests of
indifferent commercial value.

Taiwan's important natural

resources are coal, limestone, and natural gas, present in
insufficient quantities for local needs.

On the whole,

Formosa has not been bountiful.
Under Japanese rule from 1895-1945, Taiwan was an
agricultural colony.

The Japanese pursued a vigorous

exploitation policy with a view to creating an agrarian
economy to compensate for Japanese industrialization.
Taiwan exported primary products, especially rice and
sugarcane, and imported manufactured goods, that is, about
90 percent of the exports went to Japan and almost as large
a proportion of the imports came from there.
The other most important trading partner was mainland
China, although it accounted for but a modest proportion of
trade.

The per capita value of Taiwan's external trade was

39 times that of mainland China and one and one-half times
that of

J a p a n .

12

when the Republic of China took over the
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island, Taiwan's economic well-being was significantly
dependent on the export of agricultural products.
After World War II Taiwan was restored to the
Republic of China.

As a result of the war, her trade had

declined considerably.

When mainland China fell to the

Chinese Communists in 1949, Taiwan's economic relations
with the mainland were severed along with a trading
relationship.

The small island faced an urgent necessity to

shift its export market to other parts of the world.
Maurice Scott stated Taiwan's economic situation in his
article,

"Foreign Trade :"

Deprived of protected markets in Japan and China for
its exports, the economy of Taiwan was left to
reestablish itself as an independent economy for the
first time in its h i s t o r y . 13
The Taiwan government expanded agricultural products
for export, reduced imports, and coordinated industrial
development.

It concentrated on establishing and expanding

industries to supply the domestic market, expecially the
production of fertilizer to increase agricultural output.
By the end of the 1950s, when Taiwan began its export
orientation, world trade and the world economy were
embarking on a long period of constant expansion.

The world

climate and Taiwan's timing were right 11^
Under colonial rule the Japanese gave the Taiwanese
little opportunity to enter secondary and higher education.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Neither were the Taiwanese permitted to occupy any senior
governmental or managerial positions.

In 1949 a large

number of industrialists, businessmen, engineers,
scientists, and administrators migrated to Taiwan when the
Nationalists withdrew from mainland China.

Most of them

were highly educated and trained.
These mainlanders became the elite of society and made
significant contributions to economic development in Taiwan
the past 37 years.

They filled the technical personnel and

skilled supervisory vacancies caused by the departure of the
Japanese in 1945, and were responsible for government aid
as well as economic and trading policies that followed.

As

a result, Taiwan's foreign trade conditions gradually
stabilized.
When, in 1949, approximately one million Chinese
migrated from the mainland to Taiwan, the population was
estimated to be over six million,15

in the years that

followed, the population increased rapidly under Nationalist
rule.

By 1983 the population reached 18.7 million, a 1.49

percent growth rate, with a density of 520 per square
kilometer.17

This population density was one of the

highest in the world with 64.5% between the ages of 15 to
64.

This represented a tremendous and vigorous work

force.15

10
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In addition, because the government concentrated on
educational reform throughout the years, especially in
technical and vocational colleges, Taiwan has a
high-quality as well as abundant human resource to cope with
the demands of technology and international trade.

The

natural resources are limited, but the Chinese in Taiwan
view their human resource as inexhaustible.
External Factors
Corruption within the monetary system and failure to
carry out land reform were major factors in the civil war
which resulted in the Nationalists leaving the mainland.
Although they pulled out in 1949, the civil war between them
and the Chinese Communists never officially has ended.

Even

now the leaders of mainland China continually advocate the
liberation of Taiwan and unification of China.
After retreating to Taiwan, the Nationalists were eager
to establish a sound economic system and implement a series
of agricultural developments which consolidated the future
capabilities of foreign trade development.

No persuasion

was needed to enlist everyone in a campaign to rebuild and
develop Taiwan's economy.^^

In the early 1950s the

government and the people perceived intuitively that Taiwan
was their last opportunity, their last place to survive.
They had to do their best to maintain the small island— or
be buried by the Chinese Communists.

In the 1960s the

11
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ability of leadership to sustain the morale of the people in
Taiwan and expand international trade rapidly lay, in part,
upon the diplomatic support of its principal trading
partners, the United States and Japan, and upon the
country's worldwide diplomatic relations.
As the Chinese Communists, through control of China
mainland, won international recognition and became regarded
as the sole legitimate government of China, Taiwan faced
increasing difficulties in the diplomatic world.

Taiwan

maintained diplomatic relations with many countries and
membership in important international organizations until
the beginning of the 1970s, but acceptance of the Chinese
Communists as a member of the United Nations in 1971
precipitated a major change.

Taiwan withdrew from the

United Nations and lost diplomatic recognition; at the same
time, the Communist government in Beijing gained
recognition.
In the wake of Taiwan's expulsion from the United
Nations, Japan, Taiwan's most important partner in Asia,
switched its recognition to Beijing in 1972, as did 25 other
countries between 1971 and 1972.

By 1977, 111 countries had

established relations with Beijing.
maintained relations with

Only 23 countries

T a i p a i . 2 0

A further difficulty arose when the United States
established diplomatic relations with mainland China,
announced by President Carter in December 1978.

Taiwan

12
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responded by breaking off official relations with Washington
and terminating the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty.21

The

period of shock which followed caused a drop in the stock
market.

Unease about the future was experienced by the

public.

Taiwan felt that its security was seriously

threatened.
The U.S. Congress passed and President Carter signed
the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979.

This Act established a

new relationship with the United States, defined as
unofficial, and provided for many-faceted and ongoing
economic, cultural, and technological relations with Taiwan.
The Taiwanese government subsequently expanded its overseas
lobbying efforts, encouraging other countries not
recognizing Taiwan to adopt the American formula.22
Taiwan made further efforts to expand and strengthen
international trade by setting up semiofficial "substantial
diplomacies."

The economic growth and foreign trade

expansion enhanced Taiwan's stability and position in the
international business community, and helped compensate for
the series of diplomatic setbacks experienced in recent
years.

The government proved that it was capable of

adjusting to pressure and effectively leading its
businessmen into exploiting new markets via different
channels. 23
No matter what develops between Taiwan and mainland
China in the future, the latter might take advantage of
13
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Taiwan's gradually deteriorating diplomatic position to
initiate different kinds of pressure on Taiwan's foreign
trade.

The effectiveness of pressure heavily depends on the

reaction of Taiwan's trading partners, such as the United
States and Japan, to mainland China's attempt to interfere
in trade with Taiwan.

Taiwan's economic achievement and

trading development must be elevated continuously through
its "substantial diplomacy" to make the trading partners
realize that Taiwan's free enterprise system, relatively
open society, and deep involvement in foreign trade play an
active role and make a significant contribution in
international affairs.
Economic Achievements of International Trade
Any island economy, by the very nature of its
geographic arrangement, must rely on trade to survive.
Taiwan is no exception to this rule.
his article,

Wou Wei pointed out in

"New Trends in the Republic of China's External

Economy Policy," that the course of Taiwan's economic
development, like the island economies of Japan and England
which used foreign trade as transitional measures to foster
their domestic economic strengths, and gradually became less
dependent upon foreign trade, has been heavily dependent upon
foreign trade to support its agricultural and industrial
developments.

Taiwan is unlike the small island city-

states (island-urban types) of Singapore and Hong Kong,
14
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with economic development concentrated in industry in
accordance with their urban

d e v e l o p m e n t s .

24

Today, because Taiwan's geographical sea-surrounded
environment is limited, the island has become more dependent
on foreign trade to establish substantial economic ties with
other countries, hoping thereby to stimulate the economy.
Under the circumstances, Taiwan took on a high-growth rate
and export-oriented strategy of economic development in
order to generate rapid growth in foreign trade.
From 1952 to 1985, exports grew in value from $0.1
billion to $30.7 billion, and imports from $0.2 billion to
$20.1

b i l l i o n .

25

The trade balance has shown a greater

surplus every year since 1976 (with the exception of 1975,
the oil crisis year).

In 1985 the amount of trade surplus

amounted to $10.6 billion.

(See Table 1.)

During the last few years, 1975-1984, Taiwan has been
ranked second, after Singapore, in economic growth in the
w o r l d .

26

By 1985 Taiwan was ranked, via data released by

the International Monetary Fund, as the tenth largest
exporting nation in the world, well ahead of other
developing countries.
nineteenth.

For imports, Taiwan ranked

Combining imports and exports, Taiwan was the

fifteenth largest trading nation in the world.

On the

whole, Taiwan's foreign trade constituted 84.6% of its
GNP in 1985.27

This reflects Taiwan's high degree of

economic dependence on foreign trade.
15
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T a b le 1

Foreign Trade Volume

Total
trade

Year

Surplus (+)
or deficit (-)

Index'*’
(1975 = 100)

Proportion of total
trade to GNP
GNP
Proportion

1975

11,260.5

100

(-)

642.9

15,293

73.6

1976

15,765.2

140

(+)

567.4

18,318

86.1

1977

17,871.6

159

(+)

849.8

21,364

83.7

1978

23,714.0

211

(+) 1,660.2

26,196

90.5

1979

30,877.1

274

(+) 1,329.7

32,346

95.5

1980

39,543.7

351

(+)

77.5

40,022

98.8

1981

43,810.7

389

(+) 1,411.6

45,920

95.4

1982

41,092.5

365

(+) 3,315.9

46,500

88.4

1983

45,409.7

403

(+) 4,835.7

49,754

91.3

1984

52,415.5

465

(+) 8,497.3

56,638

92.5

1985

50,823.4

451

(+) 10,610.2

60,078

84.6

*Unit: U.S. $ mill ion.
^Percent growth since 1975.

Source:
R.O.C., Foreign Trade Development of the Republic of China, 1985 (Taipei:
of Economic Affairs, Board of Foreign Trade, 1986), Table 2, p. 13.

16

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Mi ni stry

The rapid expansion of Taiwan's foreign trade is guided
by a series of economic plans which establish goals and
provide incentives and stimuli for the private sector
through several approaches.

The primary features of these

approaches may be recapitulated as follows :
reform,

(1) land

(2) U.S. economic aid, and (3) export processing

zones.
Land Reform
The early land reform was carried out in three stages.
In 1949 farm rents were reduced from a prevailing level of
50 percent or more to 37.5 percent of the annual yield of
the principal crop.

In 1951 lands owned by the government

were sold to tenant farmers.

The third stage, begun in 1953

with passage of the Land-to-the-TiHer Act, was completed
in less than two years.

This program limited the holdings

of landlords to seven acres of rice land and transferred the
excess land to those farming it.

The tenants paid for the

land in 10 annual installments while the landlords received
full compensation in the form of crop bonds and stocks in
four government corporations.28
Briefly, land reform may be viewed as a recognition of
the agricultural system which, directly, provided former
tenants an incentive to put more efforts and resources into
increasing agricultural output.

Indirectly it improved

cultivation methods, especially with multiple cropping
17
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and irrigation.

Although agricultural products still

have to be imported in considerable quantities— the labor
force has tended to move agriculture into the industrial
sector— land reform provided a sound basis for export
success in agricultural products such as sugar, bananas, and
mushrooms in the early period, and consolidated the future
foundation for industrialization.^9
U.S. Economic Aid
In the early 1950s Taiwan was in a critical financial
and economic position.
in short supply.

The basic necessities of living were

The widespread budget deficit and price

inflation could have undermined the political stability and
economical viability of Taiwan.

U.S. aid primarily

nurtured public confidence in the success of the Taiwanese
government's programs.30
U.S. aid contributed to the economic transformation of
Taiwan three ways:

(1) influencing the formation of

governmental economic policies,

(2) investing directly in

development, and (3) providing goods that released Taiwan's
funds for investment.

By these approaches, aid-financed

imports accounted for 30 percent of domestic investment in
Taiwan throughout the U.S. economic aid program.
meantime, exports expanded.31

18
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In the

The most important consequence of U.S. aid was the
boosting of private enterprise by creating a climate for
private investment and promoting greater reliance on market
forces.

U.S. economic aid had been terminated in 1965, but

Taiwan was stimulated to take further steps to improve the
climate for private investment and promote exports for
economic takeoff.

Exports to obtain investments and credits

from foreign sources also were increased.^2
Export Processing Zones
After the termination of U.S. economic aid, the
government in Taiwan adopted a series of approaches for
directly reinforcing the establishment and expansion of
export industries and enacted a program for the
encouragement of foreign investment.

Three Export

Processing Zones (EPZs) were established in Kaohsiung,
Tarthung, and Nantze.
An EPZ, a combination industrial district and free
trade zone, is designed so investors can import basic
materials, process them, and export finished products.
Foreign investors setting up factories within an EPZ
receive considerable advantages and enjoy special
incentives.

These include low-cost skilled labor, exemption

from customs duties on the importation of raw materials,
machinery, parts, and exported products, tax holidays, and
developed support facilities.

All make zonal operations

attractive.2 4
19
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EPZs have contributed to Taiwan three ways:
1.

Via attracting foreign capital, about 75 percent of

the total earnings of the three EPZs were used to pay for
local costs, thereby leaving a substantial amount of foreign
exchange in Taiwan.
2.

Via technology transfer, EPZs accelerated the

development of Taiwan's industry.

That is, a number of

satellite industries gradually developed to supply the needs
of EPZs and directly influenced the island's economy.
3.

Via the rapid expansion of labor-intensive exports,

EPZs have become an important source of industrial
employment and have reduced the initial labor surplus.^^
Briefly, the contribution of EPZs to Taiwan is
accelerating in export expansions and it has multifold
significance.

Throughout the past 37 years, land reform and

U.S. economic aid has increased agricultural output and
farmers' living standards, and induced local entrepreneurs
to become investors in Taiwan's industrial and economic
development.

Stimulated by a cutoff of U.S. aid, the

establishment of EPZs helped Taiwan develop an exportoriented economy and served as a conveyor of up-to-date
technology.

These approaches have successfully shifted

Taiwan from an undeveloped to a developing country.

Based

on the smooth implementation of these approaches, Taiwan's
foreign trade has grown dramatically and been praised as a
successful model for other developing countries.
20
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Chapter 3
CURRENT BOTTLENECKS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Taiwan’s foreign trade with its export-oriented policy
has, in past years, generated much profit and placed the
country in a favorable situation.

On the other hand, a

limited domestic market has created greater dependence on
foreign trade and concentration in export markets in the
United States and Japan.
problems.

Taiwan thus faces a number of

These involve trade surplus with the United

States, imports that are heavily dependent upon Japan,
commercial counterfeiting problems, and massive foreign
exchange reserves.
At the same time, the global economy has become more
interdependent.

That is, any country's policies, economic

or political, may seriously affect other countries' economic
development.

Developed countries do their utmost to sustain

superiority in their industrial output while most developing
countries attempt to promote their industrialization.
Accordingly, both developed and developing countries try to
stimulate exports but, contrarily, block imports.

Taiwan,

faced with this sophisticated situation, is in a dilemma.
How to solve these problems and break through trading
bottlenecks have become important issues.
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Trade Surplus with the United States
Taiwan maintains economic and cultural ties with the
United States although she has received no economic aid
from the United States since the mid-1960s.

The break in

formal diplomatic relations between Taiwan and the United
States occurred at the end of 1978; nonetheless, Taiwan's
bilateral trade with the United States has continued to
exist and has grown

r a p i d l y .

Taiwan is heavily dependent on overseas supplies of raw
materials and export markets because of her limited natural
resources and export-oriented strategy.

The United States

has dominated this trade, particularly in regard to Taiwan's
export markets.

This has led to a trade surplus in

Taiwan's favor since 1967.^^

During the last 10 years,

1975-1986, Taiwan's exports to the United States increased
from U.S. $1.8 billion to U.S. $14.9 billion, and imports
from the United States increased from U.S. $1.7 billion to
U.S. $5 billion.

The average growth rate per year in regard

to exports to the United States was 20.9%, but imports from
the United States were only 12.7% (see Table 2).
By 1985 Taiwan's two-way trade with the United States
soared to U.S. $19.6 billion, accounting for 38.4% of
Taiwan's total foreign trade, which made Taiwan the sixth
largest trading partner of the United States.

Meanwhile,

Taiwan's exports to the United States of U.S. $14.8 billion
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Taiwan's Trade with the U.S.A.
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Exports
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Total trade

Imports

Year

Amount

% of
total
export

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

1,822.7
3,038.7
3,636.3
5,010.4
5,652.3
6,760.3
8,163.1
8,758.9
11,333.7
14,867.7
14,770.3

34.3
37.2
38.9
39.5
35.1
34.1
36.1
39.4
45.1
48.8
48.1

Amount

% of
total
import

1,652.1
1,797.6
1,963.8
2,376.1
3,380.8
4,673.5
4,765.7
4,563.2
4,646.4
5,041.6
4,746.5

27.8
23.7
23.1
21.5
22.9
23.7
22.5
24.2
22.9
23.0
23.6

Amount

$ of
total
trade

Surplus (+)

3,474.8
4,836.3
5,600.1
7,386.5
9,033.1
11,433.8
12,928.8
13,322.1
15,980.1
19,909.3
19,516.8

30.9
30.7
31.3
31.1
29.3
28.9
29.5
32.4
35.2
38.0
38.4

(+) 170.6
(+) 1,241.1
(+) 1,672.5
(+) 2,634.3
(+) 2,271.5
(+) 2,086.8
(+) 3,397.4
(+) 4,195.7
(+) 6,687.3
(+) 9,826.1
(+)10,023.8

"'Unit: U.S. $ Million.

C/)
C/)

Source:
R.O.C., Foreign Trade Development of the Republic of China , 1985 {Taipei;
1986), Table 13, p. 25.
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and imports from the United States of U.S. $4.8 billion left
a deficit for the United States of U.S. $10 billion.

The

trade volume made Taiwan the third largest exporter to the
United States, following Japan and Canada, in 1985.
Although the United States is Taiwan's largest trading
partner, Taiwan's continual escalating trade surplus with
the United States has become a serious bilateral trade
problem to the United States.

Additionally, the perennial

U.S. trade deficit, which has worsened in recent years, has
increased public opinion against foreign trade in American
business communities.

The subject also is heatedly

discussed in the U.S. Congress.
To right this imbalance, some urge restricting imports
while others suggest expanding American exports.

More than

300 protectionist bills have been proposed, one after
another, in the U.S. Congress.

The Jenkins and Thurmond

Amendment Bills are the most important and

t y p i c a l .

39 Thus

far these two bills have been vetoed repeatedly by President
Reagan in light of abiding by free trade, but it is expected
that protectionist pressure will resurge in the U.S.
Congress from time to time.

In face of the pressure of

mounting protectionism in the United States, Taiwan's
chronic trade surplus with the United States has become
unendurable to the United States.

Taiwan's future bilateral

trade with the United States will, without a doubt,
experience many more challenges and tests.
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The trade imbalance between Taiwan and the United
States exists for several reasons.

The major one is that

Taiwan produces low-cost and increasingly high-quality
consumer goods that are very competitive in the American
market.

The United States consequently imports large

volumes of textiles, footwear, and electronic products from
Taiwan every year.

This is more economical than

manufacturing them at home, the imported goods are
reasonably priced, and their quality is attractive.

In

return, Taiwan's imports from the United States are
primarily agricultural products (e.g., wheat, soybeans, and
cotton), chemicals, and machinery.40

on the whole, American

manufacturers' attempts to dominate Taiwan's market with
industrial products is difficult because of consumer
preferences, Japanese competition, and tariff barriers.
Taiwan's cheap, skilled labor permits the country's
attractive-quality merchandise to enter the United States
market at a low cost.

Indeed, the labor force is one of

Taiwan's most valuable assets.

The youthfulness of the

labor force and Taiwan's high standard of education increase
labor's adaptability and speed of learning, and keep
manufacturing costs low.

For instance, the expansion of

exports is concentrated on particular industries (textiles,
clothing, canned foodstuffs, and electronic products) in
which techniques, in part transferred from developed
countries, become familiar to technicians and workers.
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Accordingly, manufacturing cost, especially in the costs of
learning, could be decreased.
Furthermore, average wages in Taiwan are lower than
in the United States.

In 1985 the average monthly earnings

of manufacturing employees in Taiwan was around U.S. $340.
Even though wage rates are moving up with inflation, unit
costs still are below the United States level.

Aside from

low wages, Taiwan's laborers work long hours in comparison
with United States laborers.

In 1985, for example, the

average monthly working hours of manufacturing employees in
Taiwan was 206 hours.^3
Taiwan's high quality labor force, low wage rates, and
longer working hours give the country a competitive
advantage in labor-intensive products and encourage it to
specialize in the production and exportation of these goods.
United States investors would like to shift their production
processes from the United States to Taiwan in terms of
Taiwan's higher productivity, then repatriate the cheaper
products in order to earn substantial profits in the U.S.
market.
In 1976 the United States initiated a 10-year
Generalized System of Preferences {G S P ) under which duty
exception privileges are offered to developing countries.
Taiwan is one of the beneficiaries.

Because Taiwan's light

industrial products and processed agricultural products are
entitled to these privileges, they have become very
26
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competitive in the American market.

This has led to

sustained rapid growth in Taiwan's exports to the United
States and a trade surplus in Taiwan's favor.
Taiwan has held 27% of the share of GSP imports to
the United States (more than any other country in the
world), but the United States has not acquired the same
treatment from Taiwan.

In view of the imbalanced trade

between Taiwan and the United States, the U.S. Congress is
attempting to curtail the share allocated to Taiwan.

If

this comes about, it will be a terrible blow to Taiwan’s
critical trade relationship with the United States.^5
Because Taiwan takes on limited import liberalization,
in order to protect developing domestic industries, American
exports face considerable tariff and nontariff barriers in
the Taiwan market.

The trade surplus is, therefore, due

partly to the high tariff structure and nontariff
barriers.46
Taiwan's customs duties, viewed as financial revenues
for the government in past years, remain at a high level in
general.

For example, a number of imports, such as consumer

goods and luxury items, have tariffs as high as 100%;
machinery, word processors, and home and kitchen articles
also have excessive

t a r i f f s . 4 7

Meanwhile, tariffs have been

levied on a GIF (cost, insurance, and freight) rather than
an FOB (free on board) pricing basis, giving American
exporters an adverse position.

That is to say, the
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Japanese— America's strongest competitor in the Taiwan
domestic market— have enjoyed much lower freight charges
because of their proximity to Taiwan.

Therefore, an item

which costs exactly the same at the factory gate in the
United States and Japan will carry a higher duty if it comes
from the United States.48
Taiwan's economic development is somewhat affected
by the Japanese.

The Japanese have successfully maintained

a protected market against foreign producers by using
nontariff barriers.

Taiwan has tried to duplicate some

of the approaches to protect its domestic industries.49
As a result, nontariff barriers have built up, one after
another, against imports of a number of goods and services.
These various import bans are implemented by administrative
order or by denying import permits.

In this sense, American

exports often are subject to bans or severe limitations.
Under nontariff barriers foreign businessmen are allowed
a limited scope in insurance, accounting, shipping, and
other services.

Thus American firms face difficulties

selling services to Taiwan.
Heavy competition from Japan is another major obstacle
to expanding U.S. imports to Taiwan.

Via its proximity to

Taiwan, Japan has more trading advantages in the Taiwan
market than does the United States.

In addition to lower

shipping charges, Japanese vendors have advantages such as
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shorter delivery time and quicker backup on parts and
services.
The time difference between Taipei and Tokyo is an hour;
it takes but two hours by plane from Tokyo to Taipei.

The

cost of transporting a salesman to Taipei from Japan is
cheaper, perhaps by half, than from the United States.

When

considering time and cost, Japan can provide more proximate
and convenient after-sales service to Taiwan than can the
United States.51
Reversing the long-term imbalances on trade, which have
been a matter of serious concern between Taiwan and the
United States, cannot be done overnight.

But

progress— bilateral trade negotiations— should be made.
With the continuing efforts of both countries, the rate of
improvement should accelerate.
Taiwan should try to decrease dependence on the United
States, which would make Taiwan's foreign trade less
vulnerable to fluctuations in the American economy.

It is

expected that some of Taiwan's exports will be restricted in
the near future by protectionism in the United States
because legislators supported by economic interest groups
have increased pressure on the Reagan administration.
Taiwan does not, therefore, need to concentrate trade
exclusively on the U.S. market.

It ought, rather, to

diversify its exports to Europe or other regions of the
world, thereby dispersing its risk on international trade.
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Under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP),
Taiwan with U.S. $3 billion of its exports gaining duty-free
entry to the United States in 1984, is ranked the top
beneficiary among 140 developing countries and
t e r r i t o r i e s . 52

Any country and its products which benefit

from the GSP will "graduate" one after another from the
GSP's list sooner or later.

Taiwan is no exception.

Taiwan's exports cannot heavily depend on the GSP and
hope to enjoy long-running duty-free advantages, and Taiwan
must, therefore, quicken her pace to graduate from the GSP's
list as soon as possible.

In other words, if Taiwan expends

efforts to revamp her industrial structure and promote her
industry from labor-intensive to technology-intensive
products with low cost and high quality, it will have more
comparative advantages in the American market even without
GSP's protection.
Taiwan's current tariffs average a high 7.8%— which
often are criticized by American

e x p o r t e r s .

53

what is more

incredible is that Taiwan levies a 60% protective tariff on
imports of textiles and footwear when she has dominated most
market shares in the United States for many years.

Also,

there is a 50% tariff on imported umbrellas— and Taiwan is
the world's largest

p r o d u c e r .

54

in truth, these industries

(textiles, footwear, and umbrellas) ought to be able to
stand by themselves without continual protection.
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Today Taiwan, with tremendous foreign exchange reserves,
can afford to open her markets further.

If Taiwan intends

to stimulate domestic markets, she must lower unreasonable
import duties.

This would also reduce the trade imbalance

with the United States, lower consumer prices, increase
domestic consumption, and help stimulate production and the
economy as a whole.
Nontariff barriers might be needed to protect domestic
infant industries.

On the other hand, some industries in

Taiwan, automobiles, for example, have been protected for
many years by various kinds of import bans and still cannot
stand on their own.

This kind of nontariff barrier should

be discontinued because industries under long-term
protection become weak and dependent upon it.

Import

liberalization, in place of nontariff barriers, would help
develop and stimulate weak industries via American
technology and capital goods purchased.

It also could

narrow the growing trade gap with the United States.
Taiwan's markets are small, but their potential
buying power is good.

Taiwan has not, however, been able

to develop in some fields of high technology and she needs
to acquire this know-how from developed countries.

The

United States must take advantage of this opportunity to
catch the market share of Taiwan's imports.

In view of the

heavy competition from Japan, though, American vendors should
emphasize after-sales service— as do the Japanese in Taiwan.
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To meet this problem, American vendors must employ
local agents or distributors in Taiwan, and stock parts and
service equipment.

Building and maintaining good

reputations means that U.S. companies must send technicians
to Taiwan regularly to ensure that the parts are stocked,
technical skills are kept up, and customers' needs are
s a t i s f i e d . 5 5

Through these approaches the United States

would improve its market position in Taiwan.
Of course, Taiwan cannot declare a preference for free
trade and import liberalization one day, then wipe away all
tariff or nontariff barriers the next; but, unfair trade
deserves correction.

On the other hand, Taiwan's natural

resources are limited; it is necessary to import raw
materials for her industry and manufacturing.

If other

countries slam their doors and close their markets for
protectionism, Taiwan cannot survive.

Free trade and import

liberalization are Taiwan's only options for balancing the
trade surplus with the United States, the country's future
development in international trade, and the island's economy
as a whole.56
Imports Depend Heavily Upon Japan
After World War II Japan benefited greatly from the
tolerant and kind treatment of the Chinese and their
government, and gained much via trade with and
investments in Taiwan the past three decades.
Similarly, the Republic of China benefited from
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contacts with Japan.
These included the experience of
Japanese economic development, the introduction of
technology from Japan, and the diffusion of management
skills.57
Thus, in terms of geographic propinquity, historical
background, business practices, and approximation
of levels of technological development, Taiwan and Japan
have maintained a close relationship with one another.
Despite the break in diplomatic relations in 1972,
two-way trade between Taiwan and Japan scarcely was
affected.

Ironically, Taiwan's bilateral trade with Japan

is the inverse of that with the United States (see Table
3).

That is, as Taiwan's largest supplier, Japan has

enjoyed a consistent surplus in bilateral trade since
1946.58

Although the bilateral trade conditions with Japan

have been unfavorable, Taiwan's trade deficit has
increased— as well as her economic development and export
boost.
In the past 10 years, 1975-1984, Taiwan's imports from
Japan increased from U.S. $1,812 million to U.S. $6,442
million, and exports to Japan increased from U.S. $694
million to U.S. $3,187 million.

In other words, Taiwan's

trade deficit with Japan soared from U.S. $1.118 million to
$3,255 million.

In 1985 Taiwan's two-way trade with Japan

totaled U.S. $9,014 million:

exports to Japan were U.S.

$3,460 million and imports from Japan were U.S. $5,554
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Taiwan's Trade with Japan
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Exports

Year

Amount

% of
total
export

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

694.2
1,094.7
1,120.1
1,570.3
2,248.6
2,173.4
2,478.7
2,377.8
2,477.1
3,186.5
3,459.9
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12.4
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11.0
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10.5
11.3
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Total trade

Amount

% of
total
import

Amount

$ of
total
trade

1,812.2
2,451.5
2,643.0
3,678.1
4,561.4
5,353.2
5,928.6
4,780.2
5,586.7
6,441.8
5,554.4

30.4
32.3
31.1
33.4
30.9
27.1
28.0
25.3
27.5
29.3
27.6

2,506.4
3,546.2
3,763.1
5,248.4
6,810.0
7,526.6
8,407.3
7,158.0
8,063.8
9,628.3
9,014.3

22.3
22.5
21.1
22.1
22.1
19.0
19.2
17.4
17.8
18.4
17.7

Deficit (-)

(-)
{-)
(-)
(-)
(-)
(-)
(-)
(-)
(-}
(-)
(-)

1,118.0
1,356.8
1,522.9
2,107.8
2,312.8
3,179.8
3,449.9
2,402.4
3,109.6
3,255.3
2,094.5

CD

Q.

Unit:

U.S. $ Million.
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C/)

Source:
R.O.C., Foreign Trade Development of the Republic of China, 1985 (Taipei:
1986), Table 14, p. 26.
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million.

That left an imbalance in Japan's favor of

U.S. $2,094 million— less than the trade deficit of
U.S. $3,255 million that occurred in 1984.
Taiwan's trade deficit with Japan was reduced 35.9%
in 1985 because a series of promotional activities
produced adverse effects.

On the whole, in 1985 Taiwan's

two-way trade with Japan accounted for 17.7% of Taiwan's
total foreign trade, next to the United States.

Japan

accounted for 11.3% of Taiwan's exports, and 27.6% of the
imports (see Table 3), which made Japan the largest exporter
to Taiwan.59
Taiwan's trade deficit with Japan has existed many
years.

Taiwan has attempted to adjust her trade relations

with Japan, but it has been difficult to substantially
narrow the g a p .

The perennial trade deficit with Japan can

be attributed to five factors.
First, Taiwan was ruled by the Japanese for about 50
years.

Some entrepreneurs, especially those in the senior

generation educated under Japanese colonial administration,
share a cultural bond with the Japanese.

This colonial

heritage tends to make Taiwan businessmen prefer to
cooperate with the Japanese rather than with Americans.

In

addition a subjective, obstinate ideology has grown among
industrialists and consumers that Japanese products are
superior in quality to American ones.

Consequently Japanese

goods, such as machinery, capital equipment, or consumer
35
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goods, are exported to Taiwan in whopping quantities
every year to meet the needs of industrialists and
consumers.6 0

This is another basic reason why Japan

dominates the largest share of Taiwan’s import market.
Second, because Japan has a restrictive policy toward
the importation of manufactured products, most of Taiwan’s
exports to Japan are low-valued agricultural commodities and
processed products such as bananas, canned food, textiles,
and manufactured metals.

Taiwan's demand for Japanese

imports are costly capital goods and raw materials such as
machinery and tools, transportation equipment, and iron and
steel, which Taiwan needs for her industrial development.
Obviously, the difference in the import/export structure
between Taiwan and Japan generates an imbalance in Japan’s
favor.This

unfavorable situation, which has existed for

decades, contributes to the enormous trade gap between the
two countries.
Third, Taiwan's economy is heavily dependent on foreign
technology to support her economic development.

Taiwan

wants to upgrade her technology and attain greater
self-reliance through imported technical skills.

Japan has

been the preferred technological source because of the
geographical proximity between Taiwan and Japan, and the
relative ease with which Chinese and Japanese work
t

o

g

e

t

h

e

r

.

^2

From 1952 through 1984 Japan has accounted for
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65% of the technical cooperative ventures in Taiwan compared
to the 22% of the United

States.

Japanese firms accept cooperative agreements in order
to sell their parts and raw materials to local manufacturers
in Taiwan.

The Taiwanese firms then assemble the parts into

finished goods.

The cooperative agreements provide the

Japanese companies with extensive control of the production
processes in their host country firms.

The Japanese don't,

however, provide the Taiwanese with the sought-for
technology.

The cooperatives have not produced the greater

technological independence that Taiwan desires.

But they

have promoted trade; Taiwan has become a profitable parts
and raw materials market for Japan.^4
Fourth, Japan handles the major portion of Taiwan's
import market because she is in an ideal position to
attract Taiwan businessmen and consumers to purchase
Japanese goods.

That is, as previously noted, Japanese

vendors promote their products via excellent distribution
networks and after-sales service organizations in Taiwan.
Also, Japanese vendors are attempting to enter the domestic
financial market with low interest rates.

For example,

Japanese computer manufacturers are offering unusually
long-term leases on their machines; lessees enjoy nominal or
no lease payments for the first year or two of their leases.
The Japanese are using these strategies to channel control
of the market share in Taiwan.^5
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Fifth, as do many developing countries, Japan has
adopted high tariff rates and nontariff barriers to protect
her domestic market.

Taiwan's exports to Japan often are

subject to restrictions and strict examinations.

Vegetables

and fish particularly are restricted by high tariff rates;
machines and automobile parts are prohibited for quality
and security r e a s o n s . B e c a u s e Taiwan businessmen seldom
hold product promotion activities in Japan, they cannot
precisely understand consumers' tastes and, thus, cannot
enter the Japanese market.
In face of the perennial trade deficit with Japan, Jack
F. Williams pointed out the basic approach to solve the
problem:
This trade imbalance with Japan is unlikely to be
solved until Taiwan's economy is developed to a level
high enough that it no longer needs the technology and
high-quality consumer goods of Japan but can produce
them on the island itself.^7
Taiwan must, therefore, seek advancement in technology,
improve her industrial structure, and upgrade the quality of
her products so that she may export more to and rely less on
Japan for imports.

Furthermore, Taiwan has to strengthen

her base for foreign trade and intensify technical
coordination with North American and European countries so
as to improve her overall marketing functions.
Adjusting Taiwan's trade relations with Japan requires
expanding Taiwan's exports to Japan.

Before doing this, the

government and business community should send a survey team
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to Japan to acquire a better understanding of the
fundamental characteristics of the Japanese market and
consumers' preferences.

Too, the government should

strengthen the organization of business communities by
helping Taiwan traders exhibit their products in Japan and
explore the possibility of future sales outlets.
Although the trade imbalance with Japan cannot be
solved within a short time, Taiwan must continue her efforts
and take advantage of the recent policy of the Japanese
government to gradually open the market to augment Japanese
market shares.
steadily.

The value of Japanese yen has risen

This should make it advantageous for Taiwan to

increase exports to Japan.^8
Commercial Counterfeiting Problem
An internationally famous cosmetic manufacturer
had to go to Taiwan personally to halt a "Mom and Pop"
operation that was not only counterfeiting his product
locally but selling it on the international market.
He
found the product excellently copied, so good in fact,
that he ended up starting to buy the glass containers
which had been copied after his original and
manufactured in Taiwan.
The protection of property rights, including patent
copyrights and trademarks, has created problems in Taiwan.
Local manufacturers can produce cheap and nice counterfeits
of Rolex watches, Gucci handbags. Vaseline hair tonic, and
other hot-selling consumer products.

For example, an

imitation $1,450 Cartier Santos watch sells for $23 in
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Taiwan.

Before last year, copies of the IBM personal

computer appeared under the names Pineapple and Orange.
These models have been denied importation by U.S. Customs
and Taiwan has been accused of violating copyrights and
patents.70
The counterfeiting problem has become a worldwide
phenomenon.

It exists in many developing countries,

including Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea, Thailand, mainland
China, Mexico, Colombia, and others trying to take a
shortcut to economic

s u c c e s s . 71

Over the past several

years many developed countries, especially the United
States, have experienced a rising tide of counterfeit
products from developing countries.

They have

counterattacked by adopting legal actions and media
campaigns, and exerting economic and political pressures
upon the developing countries.
The government in Taiwan recognizes the seriousness of
counterfeiting problems and has tried to crack down on them.
Still, in 1982 Taiwan was identified as the world's major
source of counterfeit goods by the International
Anticounterfeiting Coalition.72

1985 Taiwan passed

amendments to her trademark and copyright laws.

Under the

new laws the penalties for counterfeiting trademarks
registered in Taiwan, or reproducing the intellectual work of
another without authorization, are raised to a maximum of
5- and 3-year imprisonments, respectively.73

Nonetheless,
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counterfeiters generally receive light sentences which do
not serve as strong deterrents to violators.

For example,

from January to July 1985, 353 persons were adjudicated
guilty in counterfeiting cases, but only four were sentenced
to one to two years imprisonment— a mere 1.1% of the total
cases (see Table 4).
Table 4
Statistics of Judicial Judgment in Counterfeiting
Cases from January to July 1985

No. of persons punished
1-2
6-12
months
years
Detention

Type of case

Total

2-6
months

Trademark infringement

297

163

48

4

5

77

Patent infringement

29

20

3

0

2

4

Copyright infringement

27

18

7

0

0

_2

353

201

58

4

7

83

Totals

Fine

Source:
R.O.C., Latest Developments in Actions Taken for Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights in the Republic of China for the Period January-July, 1985 (Taipei:
Ministry of
Economic Affairs, Board of Foreign Trade, 1985), p. 13.

The infringements result in monetary damages to the
infringed parties, and to the leading astray of entire
industries and smearing of the nation's image as well.
Furthermore, counterfeiting has generated negative effects
on the business and investment climate.

Foreign investors
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cite poor patent protection as a primary reason for their
reluctance to take high technology to

T a i w a n .

74

The causes of counterfeiting are complicated.

A major

cause of counterfeiting is generated by international firms
that specifically and persistently engage in the importation
of counterfeit goods to other countries.

They shuttle

between developing countries with a variety of samples of
best-selling commodities, take advantage of low labor
costs in those countries, and produce large quantities of
counterfeit goods.
world.

Then the goods are shipped around the

Sometimes the manufacturers in the developing

countries are not aware their mass production of the samples
constitutes counterfeiting.

When a country implements

strong measures against counterfeiting, the international
firms transfer their activities to another

c o u n t r y .

75

The shortsightedness of Taiwan's industrialists is
another cause of counterfeiting.

During the past two

decades Taiwan has experienced rapid economic development
and is trying to develop more technology-intensive
industries.

Many local industries have acquired the

technological capability to manufacture a wide variety of
products, but they have invested little in research,
development, or marketing.

Because they are lagging behind,

the industrialists are tempted to use the trademarks,
research, and developmental efforts of others as a shortcut
to financial success.
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Some industrialists in Taiwan are not well-educated.
They fear high technology— and failure.

They hesitate

to design new products, create new brands, establish
marketing channels, and exploit new foreign markets.
Rather than cooperate with governmental directives to
invest money in research and development, they pursue
self-interests via counterfeiting.

As long as their

products are lucrative, their fear is less when they risk
imitating hot-selling, popular products and inundating the
international markets at discount prices.76
In practice, these speculators realize that cranking
out low cost copies cannot continue.

At the same time, an

old Chinese proverb is deeply rooted in their minds:

"It is

better to be the head of a chicken than the tail of an ox."
Each wants to acquire maximum profits for as long as
possible regardless of the consequences.77
Counterfeiting has disclosed that a serious gap exists
between manufacturing capacity and marketing, research, and
development in Taiwan.

To overcome this weakness, the

government should require industrialists to spend a fixed
percentage of annual sales on research and development.
This would encourage them to design new products and
generate a greater incentive to develop marketing
expertise.7 8
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In addition to emphasizing research and development,
the government should consider the following as other ways
of combating the counterfeiting problem:
1.

Increasing penalties for counterfeiting and

refusing to commute imprisonments into fines.
2.

Forming a professional tribunal on trademarks,

patents, and copyright matters to facilitate the
adjudication of counterfeiting cases.
3.

Upgrading the status of the Anticounterfeiting

Committee to strengthen the Committee's role in the
planning, supervision, and coordination of a nationwide
campaign against counterfeiting.
4.

Stepping up the cultivation of talents in the field

of commercial design and encouraging creative work in an
effort to eliminate counterfeiting.
5.

Accelerating social education to instill correct

ideas into the minds of the people re the protection of
property rights that should not be infringed upon or
used arbitrarily.79
If these methods were strictly implemented, the
counterfeiters gradually would vanish.

In the meantime,

the counterfeiting issue has greatly hindered Taiwan from
launching into a new era of trading development.

If Taiwan

wishes to sustain a good standing in the international
economic community, and attract foreign investment,
technology know-how, and international trade, she must make
44
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every effort to shed her copycat image.

Although Taiwan has

a long way to go before her copyright and trademark
protection meets standards expected in the developed world,
she must persuade her industrialists to look beyond their
immediate quick profits and lift their visions toward
larger, more lasting gains.
A Burden as a Result of the Massive
Foreign Exchange Reserves
In its increasing access during the past 30 years
to the bounty of an affluent society, the Republic of
China on Taiwan has accumulated massive and
still-growing foreign exchange reserves.
It is now
awash in an overflow of idle capital.
Meanwhile,
various sectors of the economy, the overall society,
and especially of industry cannot find the financial
investment needed to improve their structures and
technology for future challenges.
After their long
voyage from an island backwater to a status as one of
the world's better-off national communities, both our
people and government must face a truly big problem:
"How to use money?"80
Many developing countries worry about their onerous
foreign debts, but Taiwan wonders how to digest massive
foreign exchange reserves.

As of January 1986 Taiwan had

a foreign debt of only U.S. $5 billion, but she has
accumulated U.S. $26.1 billion in foreign exchange reserves.
The Central Bank of China holds U.S. $22.5 billion and nine
commercial "foreign exchange" banks hold approximately
U.S. $3.6 billion.

It is expected that reserves could reach

U.S. $35 billion at the end of 1986.

The size of Taiwan's

foreign exchange holding is ranked fifth in the world behind
45
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West Germany, the United States, Japan, and France.81

The

total account is equal to the combined foreign exchange
reserves of Canada, South Korea, and the five ASEAN members
(the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and
Singapore).82
According to a general standard, a country should have
foreign currency sufficient to purchase three to six months
worth of imports.

In 1985 Taiwan imported U.S. $20 billion

worth of goods which required a monthly expenditure of about
$1.6 billion.

With the Central Bank holding U.S. $22.5

billion, Taiwan's foreign exchange reserves can purchase
13 months worth of

i m p o r t s .

83

it is

reserves are in excess of the normal

obvious that the
standard and that they

represent idle money.
While the massive accumulation of foreign exchange
reflects that the consecutive trade surpluses were
achieved by Taiwan because of her success in export
expansion, it also creates a serious problem.
huge amount of idle foreign exchange

That is, the

reserves was deposited

in local banks or abroad to earn interest; it

was not

appropriately invested in upgrading the overall economy,
the industrial structure, and elevating living standards.
In general, 90% of Taiwan's imports are raw materials
and machines which are used to support the island's
industrial development.

In recent years Taiwan's economy

has faced a labor-intensive/technology-intensive transition,
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but some industries have failed to adequately maintain and
replenish equipment and machines.

Additionally, the

government's economic orientation and alternative paths
are unclear.

Thus a willingness to invest, via public or

private sector, remains

l o w . 84

Taiwan's capital investment in raw materials and
equipment has declined since 1980.

In 1980 the capital for

public and private industries totaled New Taiwan Dollar
(NT $) 456 billion, which accounted for 31% of the GNP.

By

1985 the capital for public and private industries was
almost unchanged at NT $455 billion, but it accounted for
only 19% of the GNP.8 5
In the wake of the decrease in capital investment, the
annual imports of raw materials and machines also declined.
As long as public or private willingness to invest remained
low, the imports of capital investment would not increase.
Furthermore, the overabundant foreign exchange reserves of
trade surplus— exports over imports— would continue to
increase as well.
On the other hand, the high foreign exchange reserves
and low capital investment signify that Taiwan has not
developed an appropriate capital market to transform its
savings into investment.

That is to say, Taiwan's huge

amount of export earnings flow into short-term foreign
securities rather than into long-term domestic investments.
Most of this huge foreign exchange surplus has been used
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to purchase foreign national bonds, mostly U.S., with a
yearly payoff of about

1 0

%.^6

should the rates of foreign

exchange fluctuate drastically, the foreign currencies
deposited in foreign banks would incur a great loss if
risk were not dispersed.
Under the present successive trade surplus, the
NT Dollar has been forced to appreciate in order to curb
increases in the foreign exchange reserves.

This situation

puts the government and industries in a dilemma and is
forming a latent crisis to Taiwan's future economic
development four ways:
1.

It will discount the value of foreign exchange

reserves whether deposited in local or foreign banks.
2.

Due to the appreciation of NT Dollars, Taiwan's

exports will become less competitive— especially during a
growing economic recession.
3.

If economic recession persists, it will result in

high unemployment and directly impact public living
standards.
4.

If worse comes to worse, Taiwan will lose her

ability to improve the country's overall economic and social
structure as well as competitiveness in markets around the
w o r l d .® ^
The most direct and effective way to resolve the
massive foreign exchange reserves is to open up Taiwan's
markets through import expansion.

This method would not
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only enable local people to enjoy a higher quality of life
but allow other countries to participate in foreign exchange
with Taiwan and stimulate their economic growths also.
Meanwhile, increasing imports can force domestic industries
to upgrade their product quality, make their operations more
efficient, and reach new milestones through competition.88
In case of an overall economic transition, every sector
of Taiwan--industrial, technological, research and
development, the basic infrastructure, the environment, and
education— needs money for further development.

Because

public and private willingness to invest remains low and
most industrialists don't know how to make appropriate
investments, the government should draft an investment
program that would include equipment replenishment,
productivity promotion, marketing strategies, and efficient
management to guide hesitant industrialists.^^

As the

investment climate warmed and assumed shape, the mass of
frozen idle capital would thaw and find an outlet.
Besides increasing domestic investment, the Taiwan
government must encourage industrialists to engage in
overseas investments because the massive foreign exchange
reserves serve as potential assets.
foreign exchange was deficient.

Before, Taiwan's

Capital that flowed out of

the country was viewed as a kind of capital loss.

Thus the

government restricted the overseas activity of Chinese firms
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in regard to the amount that could be invested and set
stipulations on the debt/profit ratio.
It's another story today.

If Taiwan approaches

overseas investment, especially in the United States, it
could acquire four advantages:
1.

Digesting the overabundance of idle capital.

2.

Offsetting the pressure of foreign protectionism.

3.

Having access to foreign markets, management,

and high technology.
4.

Elevating Taiwan's economic and trading status in

the world.90
Via overseas investment Taiwan can strengthen its
competence to meet the competitive trading challenge of
developing countries.

The foreign exchange reserves

resemble a reservoir that can release excessive water and
let needed water flow in.

How to control the floodgate of

foreign exchange reserves while avoiding inundation or
insufficiency is the government's obligation.
If Confucius were alive today, he would not say, "Worry
not about scarcity but uneven distribution; worry not about
poverty but instability."

He would be more likely to say,

"Worry not about sufficient funds but low investment; worry
not about wealth but how to use it."
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Chapter 4
FUTURE PROSPECTS
Strong Competition from South Korea
Like Taiwan in past decades. South Korea has been
acclaimed one of Asia's Four Dragons due to its soaring
economic achievement.

Although South Korea is facing a

number of political challenges from North Korea's military
threat, students' demonstrations, and the political
pressures of opposing parties, it has not discarded its
ideal to march toward a country with great economic power.
Furthermore, South Korea announced that when it hosts the
Olympic Games in Seoul in 1988, it will do so in the guise
of a fully advanced country.^1
Taiwan and South Korea have basically identical
cultural backgrounds that stem from the Confucian
discipline.

Confucian devotion to education molds people

who are literate and ambitious.

As Confucian believers,

Taiwan and South Korea are progressing rapidly in economic
development and international trade and are displaying
remarkable achievements.

South Korea acts more intrepid

than Taiwan and is more ahead in some respects.

Today,

South Korea is a strong competitive rival to Taiwan in
international trade.
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Taiwan and South Korea took a similar approach, by
export expansion means, to stimulate their economic
growths, but South Korea preferred a devaluation policy,
without regard to inflation, to promote its exports.

Unlike

South Korea, Taiwan stressed price stability with a view to
avoiding economic unsteadiness and inflation.

As a result.

South Korea's export prices in U.S. dollars have gradually
become more competitive than Taiwan's prices in recent
years.^2
In addition. South Korea upgraded industrial exports
with greater intensity than Taiwan.

In other words, the

South Korean government directly interfered in the country's
industries in order to acquire dramatic gains in industrial
growth and export performance.9 3

Consequently, under the

government's power a number of small companies were forced
to merge.

Several conglomerates were formed such as

Hyundai, Daewoo, and Samsung.
The government supports these conglomerates by foreign
debts.

These conglomerates also responded to government

directives to invest in research and development, purchase
advanced technology from overseas, and establish commercial
information networks in developed countries.

Presently,

through trial and error. South Korea has built up steel,
automobile, and shipbuilding industries which can compete
directly against Japan.

Last year South Korean automobiles

replaced Japanese cars as Canada's No. 1 import.
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This year

H y u n d a i ' s n e w car,
States,

the Excel, we n t on sale in the United

and orders w er e strong.

The g o v e r n m e n t in T aiwan used less pressure and fewer
i n d u c e me n ts to p e rsuade pri vate enterprises to merge and
fo rm c on g l o m e r a t e s than did South Korea which had mammoth
i nd u st r ia l groups d r iv i ng the entire economy.

Contrarily,

n um e ro u s small compan ies exist in almost every industry in
T a i w a n b e cause e ve ryone wants to be a company president.
A c c o r d i n g to 1983 data,

85% of all factories employed fewer

th an 50 w or k e r s and 89% had fixed assets worth less than
US $250,000.95
In the past years these small companies, which
p r i m a r i l y w er e family-oriented,

contr ibuted much to

d e v e l o p i n g Ta iwan's international trade.
r ev e a l e d

They also

weaknes s es in ch anges in the world trade picture

and South Korea's strong competition.

The major weakness

is that the companies are too small to do their own
m a r k e t i n g overseas.

Th ey have too little capital and

e x p e r i en c e to invest in high technology and elbow aside
m u l t i n at i on a l compet it o rs in foreign markets.
Taiwan, w i t h her m assive foreign exchange reserves-u nlike South K o re a w h i c h had only U.S.

$2.6 billion in

f oreign e x change reserves and a foreign debt that reached
to $45 bi l li o n in 1 9 8 5 — has the capital and ca pability
to co m p e t e w i t h South K o r e a .96

in order to meet South

K or e a ' s strong c o m p e t i t i o n and catch up with her industrial
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exports, Taiwan should merge the out-of-date and family-run
companies.

The government must offer subsidies and tax

concessions to companies investing in high technology
industries.

Ultimately, for the purpose of overtaking South

Korea's marketing strategy, Taiwan must set up marketing
networks and distribution channels in the world to collect
commercial information and gain a bigger market share in
foreign countries.
Effects of the Open-door Policy
of Mainland China
When Deng Hsiao-ping took over the Communist regime
in 197 8, mainland China opened her door and engaged in
economic reform which involved the marketization of
transactions and privatization of property rights.
Furthermore, this reform opened foreign capitalist trade,
loans, and investments.

This helped the backward economy

that resulted from mainland China's self-imposed 20-year
isolation.^7

whether or not Deng's economic reform

succeeds or fails, it has at least provided an opportunity
for Chinese people to become acquainted with the Western
world and touch the capitalistic society.
Along with her open-door policy, mainland China has
actively involved herself in foreign trade.

More and

more "Made in China" products are being rushed into
international markets, especially the American market.
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Most

of the mainland China exports to the United States are cheap
textiles and garments, which are Taiwan's major exports
also, second to electrical machinery and apparatus.

In face

of the pressure in the American market from the low-wage
competitor of mainland China, Taiwan would gradually lose
her advantage in the cloth and clothing trade.

W hat’s more,

if mainland China persists in her current economic reform,
it is expected that mainland China will catch up with
Taiwan's exports in footwear, toys, canned foods, sporting
goods, and paper products in the future.98
Mainland China launched a series of peaceful overtures
for establishing "three links" (mail, trade, and
air/shipping services) with Taiwan as a first step toward
the ultimate goal of reunification.

Taiwan has tenaciously

insisted on a "three no" policy (no contacts, no
negotiation, and no compromise) with her old enemy.^^

It's

interesting that, indirectly, a trading relationship between
Taiwan and mainland China has been forming since the late
1970s.

This has grown significantly up to the present

t im e .10 0
Official Taiwan figures show that total indirect trade
was U.S. $51,000 in 1977.

That figure jumped to U.S. $21

million in 1979, U.S. $242 million in 1980, and U.S. $390
million in 1981.101

in 1984, total indirect trade came to

U.S. $560 million and to U.S. $1.5 billion in 1985 of which
Taiwan's exports accounted for 77%.1®^

Most of the indirect
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trade passes through Hong Kong, Singapore, or Japan, which
then is sold to mainland China.

The major Taiwan exports to

mainland China are older-model motorcycles, black-and-white
TV sets, and machinery; mainland China exports only cotton
and Chinese medicines to

Taiwan.

103

Direct trade with mainland China is illegal in Taiwan
now.

The Taiwan government does not, however, interfere

with indirect trade because the "Made in Taiwan" products
are sold to buyers (middlemen) in Hong Kong or Japan.

As

before stated, Taiwan is deficient in natural resources and
raw materials which mainland China can supply sufficiently,
yet Taiwan's highly productive industrial economy can
manufacture many products such as calculators, electronics,
appliances, machinery, and so on which currently are much in
demand in mainland China.
In theory, through indirect trade it appears that there
will be an economic complementarity between Taiwan and
mainland China.1 0 4

t o o

,

it will give Taiwan a chance to

enter this big market and demonstrate the superiority of her
economic system.

In reality, with respect to political

issues, indirect trade is very complicated; it is far from
being clear and simple.
Taiwan has two concerns:

how long mainland China's

open door policy will be in effect and how dependable the
mainland market is.

If, in the indirect foreign trade

relationship, Taiwan becomes overly dependent upon mainland
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China, Taiwan would have difficulty surviving should the
relationship suddenly terminate.
economy would be bankrupt.

Indeed, her overall

It is hoped that the growing

trade is the result of natural forces deriving from the
increased liberalization of economic planning and trade on
mainland China.105
In general, trade is more or less risky--whether with
mainland China or other foreign countries.

The Taiwan

government cannot, therefore, adopt a "head in the sand"
policy to evade the indirect trade issue with mainland
China.

The government ought, instead, to provide her

manufacturers and traders with information about marketing
in mainland China, and teach the businessmen how to disperse
trade risks if they want to penetrate the mainland China
market through middlemen.

By means of indirect trade,

opening the mainland China door wider should be pleasing
to the Chinese in both countries.
Governmental and Entrepreneurial Efforts
Now, spurred by intense competition from lesser
developed areas with cheaper labor, Taiwan's economy is
undergoing a second transition.

The traditional industries

in Taiwan, such as textiles and the assembly of consumer
electronic products, served the island well when her economy
was in the early stages of industrialization and there was a
huge amount of inexpensive manpower to be employed.
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Today, because of an increasing standard of living, labor
in Taiwan is not as cheap as before.

The labor-intensive

industries, which gradually have become sunset industries,
are unable to effectively compete in the international
market against the cheap labor of Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri
Lanka, and mainland China.106
Under these circumstances the Taiwan government and her
industrialists need to understand that there is only one way
to go.

The country's future development in foreign trade is

dependent upon upgrading industries in the direction of more
sophisticated capital and technology-intense operations such
as computers and precision machinery.

Success will require

large amounts of human capital in the form of skilled
laborers, technicians, engineers, and managers.
The government should expand and improve vocational and
technical education to cope with the future technical and
mechanical needs.

Also, the industrialists could hire

executives and managers from developed countries as
technical advisors and managers in the factories.107
The government or the industrialists could try to lure
overseas Chinese employed in high technology companies in
advanced countries to return home, and use them to set up
and promote high technology methods in Taiwan.
International trade today has become increasingly
oriented toward marketing rather than production.
Collecting and transmitting market information promptly to
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traders presently is weak in Taiwan.

The government should

try to establish a nationwide commercial information center
for exporters.

Through this center, manufacturers and

exporters could obtain appropriate information that would
enhance understanding about which kinds of products are
competitive and which potential foreign markets are worth
exploiting.

It could educate exporters learning to evaluate

their competitors' strong and weak points and assist them in
analyzing new market trends.10 8
In view of the changing international market and rising
wages, the future prospects of Taiwan's foreign trade will
rely on how rapidly Taiwan can transform its labor-intensive
industries into technology-intensive industries.
a critical factor.

Timing is

The Taiwan government and the

industrialists must accelerate their pace to improve the
island's industries in order to upgrade Taiwan's competition
in international markets.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
International trade is vital to Taiwan.

Throughout

the years, under a strong and stable economic system,
Taiwan has built a solid foundation for its foreign trade.
In the 1970s two oil shocks and two political shocks— the
1971 expulsion from the United Nations and the 1979
withdrawal of U.S. diplomatic recognition— rendered
Taiwan a terrible blow, but success with the export
expansion policy has enhanced Taiwan's self-reliance and her
trade capabilities.

Furthermore, it has proven that the

island's economic and trading achievement can withstand any
test of radical shifts in the international community.
In the past years the world economic situation has
undergone some unfavorable changes.

Sentiments of

protectionism have risen to an unprecedented height in most
developed countries and have adversely affected Taiwan's
foreign trade.

In addition, Taiwan's foreign trade has

reached a peak and some products, when compared with those
of cheap-labor developing countries, have lost their
competitive advantage.
Under economic transition, today Taiwan's foreign trade
faces a number of problems.

The essential question is how
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to identify, develop, and exploit new areas of comparative
advantage in the future international environment.
Facing such a double challenge from developed countries
and developing countries requires that Taiwan revamp her
industrial structure, increase her productivity, and secure
raw material sources in order to support sustained export
growth.

Taiwan has to internalize her economy and

liberalize all import restrictions and, thereby, stimulate
domestic industries toward advanced development.

Moreover,

commodity and market diversification are urgent.
The Taiwan government and business community have
accumulated substantial experience in adapting themselves to
new situations at each initial juncture.

The government and

businessmen have, therefore, sufficient competence to take
appropriate approaches when coping with today's trading
obstacles.

With a concerted effort of the government and

the people, Taiwan ought to be able to achieve a new
milestone in the course of her trading development.

If

successful, Taiwan's struggle in international trade will be
a beacon of hope and a source of motivation to others facing
the same kind of trading problems.
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